- Head Iraqi Weapons Investigator May Leave (December 18, 2003)
...s hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the head of the U.S. team, David Kay, is considering leaving the job early next year, well before the work is c... - Admit WMD Lie, Survey Chief Tells Bush (March 3, 2004)
...David Kay, the man who led the CIA's postwar effort to find weapons of mass destruct... - Wolfowitz: Weapons Issue Secondary In Iraq (July 22, 2003)
...is important. But it is not of immediate consequence." The CIA has put David Kay, a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, in charge of the searc... - MIA WMDs--For Bush, It's a Joke (March 25, 2004)
...before the 9/11 commission), I was able to chat with former weapons hunter David Kay and learn about some troubling developments in the intelligence community... - White House Faulted on Uranium Claim (December 24, 2003)
...oup looking into weapons activities in that country under the direction of David Kay reported in October that it found no support for the report that Hussein w... - Carnegie Study Calls Iraq Threat Overstated (January 9, 2004)
...ew York Times. The official said it was unclear whether lead inspector David Kay, who has been on vacation in the United States, would return to Iraq. B... - Iraqi Weapons Report May Have Been True (September 9, 2003)
... investigative team headed top Central Intelligence Agency weapons analyst David Kay that began its own search for banned Iraqi weapons shortly after the fall... - Russian Minister Says Iraq Attack a Mistake (February 5, 2004)
...en left in Iraq for their further development." "A US commission led by David Kay has arrived at the conclusion that no such traces were found," Fedotov wen... - US Expert Finds No Banned Weapons in Iraq (October 2, 2003)
...WASHINGTON — Chief U.S. weapons searcher David Kay reported Thursday he had found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, a f... - Study of Rhetoric On Iraq Urged (February 11, 2004)
...David Kay, the former chief U.S. arms inspector in Iraq, said yesterday that Preside... - Blame, Blindness ... (February 3, 2004)
...it would be folly to limit any inquiry to just the intelligence community. David Kay assures us that intelligence analysts were not pressured by the Bush admin... - Kay Blames Intelligence on Iraqi Misrepresentation (January 26, 2004)
...ge stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons after the U.S.-led war. David Kay, who resigned Friday, also said that the looting and rioting that followed... - Head US Inspector in Iraq Resigns, Citing Lack of Weapons (January 23, 2004)
...WASHINGTON — David Kay, who led the U.S. effort to find banned weapons in Iraq, said Friday after... - CNN's Nuke Plant Photos Identical for Both Iran and N. Korea (February 14, 2005)
..." -- might be somewhat amusing. In the piece, U.S. chief weapons inspector David Kay is quoted urging the U.S. "not to make the same mistakes with Iran that he... - Bush Approval Ratings Slip with Weapons Report (October 3, 2003)
...o claim the rush to war was a mistake. The interim report by the CIA's David Kay, the chief U.S. weapons inspector, was more bad news for a White House alr... - Borger, Julian (March 3, 2004). Admit WMD mistake, survey chief tells Bush. The Guardian (Guardian Unlimited).
- Lakely, James G. Bush confers with Kay, sets appointment of panel. The Washington Times.
- Whitelaw, Kevin (February 9, 2004). 'We Were All Wrong.' U.S. News & World Report, pp 24–25.
David Kay
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
David Kay is an American scientist who is best known for acting as a weapons inspector in Iraq. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Texas at Austin, and also a Masters in International Affairs and Ph.D. from Columbia University.
Kay worked as Chief Scientist for the Pentagon from 1983 to 1988 and also was the UN Chief Weapons Inspector from 1983 to 1992. Following that, he was Vice President of Science Applications Internatinal Corporation (SAIC) from 1993 to 2002. While at SAIC, he worked alongside of Stephen Hatfill until March 2002. Then, he was appointed as a Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs. He received the International Atomic Energy Agency's Distinguished Service Award and the U.S. Secretary of State's Commendation. (SAIC was contracted by the U.S. to build prototype Mobile Weapons Laboratories in fall of 2001)
After the 1991 Gulf War, Kay led teams of inspectors in Iraq to search out and destroy banned chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he returned to the country, working with the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. military in 2003 and 2004 to determine if Saddam Hussein's regime had continued developing banned weapons. (See Iraq Survey Group)
The research of his team determined that the Iraqi unconventional weapons programs had mostly been held in check, with only small amounts of banned material uncovered (this included a number of vials containing biological agents stored in the home refrigerators of Iraqi scientists, for example). However, none of these substances had been “weaponized”—no such agents were found in missiles or artillery, and none could be easily installed. These discoveries indicate that some of the primary reasons President George W. Bush used for going to war with Iraq did not reflect the true situation in that country, and contradicted statements made by Kay himself in the lead-up to the war.
Before the 2003 war, as U.S. government officials were pushing the idea that Saddam Hussein was in possession of WMD, many people would direct reporters toward David Kay to reinforce their point of view. In September 2002, Kay told U.S. News & World Report that “Iraq stands in clear violation of international orders to rid itself of these weapons.” His credibility as a former U.N. weapons inspector convinced many observers. However, the investigation following the war forced Kay to completely reverse his opinions.
On January 23, 2004, Kay was replaced in his role by Charles Duelfer, and spent the following days discussing his discoveries and opinions with the news media and the United States political establishment. He testified on January 28, 2004 that “[i]t turns out that we were all wrong” and “I believe that the effort that has been directed to this point has been sufficiently intense that it is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed, militarized chemical weapons there.” However, Kay attempted to exonerate the Bush administration by indicating even if Iraq did not have weapons stockpiles, that did not mean the nation wasn't dangerous. Defending the President, Kay attempted to place blame on faulty intelligence gathering. On February 2, 2004, Kay met with George W. Bush at the White House and maintained that Bush was right to go to war in Iraq and characterized Saddam's regime as “far more dangerous than even we anticipated” when it was thought he had WMDs ready to deploy.
A month later, in an interview with the British Guardian newspaper, Kay changed tack once again. This time, he called for Bush to “come clean,” and said “He should say we were mistaken and I am determined to find out why.”
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