

SECURITY SURVIVAL SKILLS

What they are, why we need them and how to implement them

ACTIVISM AND STATE REPRESSION

This pamphlet has essential information for anyone associated with groups advocating or using economic disruption or sabotage, theft, arson, self-defence from police or more militant tactics. The advice that follows also applies to anyone associated with groups practising civil disobedience, especially since people can work in several groups at the same time and gossip travels freely between them.

Even if you've never expressed your politics by doing property damage, pitching cobblestones, or getting arrested for civil disobedience; even if you think you have nothing to hide, these guidelines will enhance your personal safety as well as the movement's overall effectiveness. State surveillance of political movements has always been a reality and still is. Governments in the industrialized countries target groups that advocate economic sabotage and groups that don't, movements that are militant and movements that are markedly pacifist. The government's security machinery serves the elitist political and economic objectives of capitalism. There are over 250 political prisoners in Canada and the US that can testify to this from firsthand experience. By adopting a security culture, we can limit or neutralize counter-intelligence operations meant to disrupt our political organizing, be it mainstream or underground.

Peasant-rebels; communards; liberationists; abolitionists; labour organizers; revolutionaries; from large uprisings challenging the entire political structure, to isolated environmental and social struggles, people have constantly worked to create a better world. The response of government has always been to jail activists and revolutionaries using the courts and the police.

As direct action movements become more effective, government surveillance and harassment increases. Minimizing the destructiveness of political repression requires that we implement and promote a *security culture* within our movement.

SO WHAT IS A SECURITY CULTURE?

It's the practice of precaution and knowing what is and isn't safe to talk about, with whom, where, and at what times. Those who already understand the necessity of a security culture also know which habits compromise security and they are quick to share their knowledge with those people who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or moments of weakness, partake in insecure behaviour. When a consciousness and practice of secure habits spreads throughout a group, a security subculture exists. Security violations are then recognized and made unacceptable for the group.

WHAT NOT TO SAY / "DON'T ASK & DON'T TELL"

To begin with, certain things are inappropriate to talk about. Here are some:

- ◆ your involvement or someone else's involvement with an underground group
- ◆ someone else's desire to get involved with such a group
- ◆ asking others if they are a member of an underground group
- ◆ your participation or someone else's participation in any action that was illegal
- ◆ someone else's advocacy or knowledge of such actions
- ◆ your plans or someone else's plans for a future illegal action

There is a common point to all this: it compromises the security and effectiveness of individuals, groups, and actions to speak about a specific individual's involvement, past, present or future, with illegal activities. These are unacceptable topics of discussion regardless of whether it is rumour, speculation or personal knowledge. That said, it isn't a problem to speak about direct action in general terms. It is legal and desirable that people speak out in support of all forms of resistance. The danger lies in linking individual activists to specific actions or groups.

THREE EXCEPTIONS

There are only three occasions where it is acceptable to speak about such information.

The first is if you are planning an action with other members of your small group (your "cell" or affinity group). The only people who need to hear this discussion are those persons actively partaking in the action. Anyone not involved does not need to know and, therefore, should not know. This is communication done on a **need-to-know** basis. That said, it is nonetheless highly insecure to discuss these things over Internet (e-mail), telephone, through the mail, in an activist's home or car, or in a group's meeting place, since these places and forms of communications are easily and frequently monitored.

The second exception occurs after an activist facing criminal charges has been found guilty and sentenced. The activist can then speak of the actions for which she/he was convicted. However, she/he must never reveal information that could point authorities to other persons who participated in illegal activities.

The third exception is for anonymous letters and interviews with the media. This must be done very carefully and without compromising security. Advice on secure communication techniques can be found in other publications.

Those are the only situations when it is appropriate to speak about your own or someone else's involvement or plan to do illegal direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES

Well-informed and long-time activists only allow a select few to know about their involvement with direct action groups. These few consist of the group members with whom they do the actions AND NO ONE ELSE!

The reason for these security precautions is obvious: **if people don't know anything, they can't talk about it.** It also means that only the people who know certain things can face jail time if the activity is revealed and compromised. Activists who don't face the same serious consequences have no reason to know about an illegal direct action. They are more likely to talk

when harassed and intimidated by the authorities since they aren't the ones who will go to jail. Even trustworthy people can blunder or be tricked by the authorities into revealing damaging and incriminating information. So it is safest for all cell members to keep their involvement in the group amongst themselves. The fewer people who know, the less evidence there is to bust them.

Divulging information to even trusted persons makes them complicit in the action and is more than they need to know. Showing them your trust may reinforce links, but this should be secondary to the security of the action and persons involved. Knowledge should be on a *need-to-know* basis. You should know enough to do your chosen work, but not enough to make you complicit in a broader range of criminalizable activity. If someone tells you about things that are not your business, you should stop the person and explain why you are uncomfortable with the information they are telling you.

SECURITY VIOLATING BEHAVIOURS

In an attempt to impress others, activists may behave in ways that compromise security. Some people do this frequently - they habitually gossip and brag. Some activists say inappropriate things only when they consume alcohol, while others make occasional breaches of security because there was a momentary temptation to say something or hint at something that shouldn't be said or implied. Many activists make occasional breaches of security simply because they are around others sharing similar views. Whatever the reason, loose lips violate security culture. Authorities rely on this. Low-level surveillance is practised by all intelligence agencies, and consists of collecting even the smallest and seemingly insignificant scraps of information to send to national and international centralized computer networks. In order to be more effective, we need more precautions and discretion. We sometimes forget that struggling to subvert the established order and bring about a better world is indeed a crime.

Activists who strongly desire the approval of their peers can be high security risks. Certainly it is natural to seek friendship and recognition for our efforts, but it is more important that our personal needs do not jeopardize the safety of other activists or ourselves. On the other hand, it is also our collective responsibility to ensure that *all* activists receive the recognition they deserve for their efforts - not just the intellectuals, the organizers, "informal leaders", talking heads or "stars". With recognition and acceptance we build solidarity, achieve greater equality in our movements and enhance security culture as a whole. But still, placing the desire for friendship over the importance of the cause can do serious damage to our movements.

The following are examples of security-violating behaviours:

Lying: To impress others, liars claim to have done illegal actions. Such lies not only compromise the person's security - as cops will not take what is said as a lie - but also hinders movement solidarity and trust.

Gossiping: Some people think that they can win friends because they are privy to special information. These gossips will tell others about who did what actions or, if they don't know who did it, speculate and spread rumours about who might have done it. This sort of talk is very damaging. Rumours are all that is needed to launch a police investigation and lay charges.

Bragging: Some people who partake in illegal direct action might be tempted to brag about it to their friends. If someone did such a thing, it would not only jeopardize the bragger's security, but also that of the other people involved with the action (as they may be suspected by association),

as well the people who he told (they can become accessories after the fact). An activist who brags also sets a terrible example to other activists.

Indirect-Bragging: Indirect-braggers are people who make a big production of how they want to remain anonymous, avoid protests, and stay "underground." They might not come out and say that they do illegal direct actions, but they make sure that everyone knows that they are doing "heavy" stuff. They are no better than braggers, but they try to be more sophisticated about it by pretending to maintain "security." However, if they were serious about security, they would just make up a good excuse as to why they are not as active, or why they can't make it to the protest. Concealing sensitive information from even trusted comrades is far better than jeopardising underground work.

Debriefing: Certain people - just before, or after doing an illegal action - may want to speak about it with others. This confiding may be a way of relieving tension and/or may be born of the strong feeling of exaltation from a job well done. There should always be a time and place set aside for debriefing between participants, but even alluding to these activities among other comrades in insecure places like crowded bars is a severe security risk.

SELF-EDUCATION TOWARDS LIBERATION

With the above information about security, it should be easier to spot those activists who compromise our movement's security. So what do we do with people who display these behaviours? Do we shun or expel them from our groups and projects? Actually, no - not for the first security violation, at least.

The unfortunate truth is there are some security-ignorant people in the movement and others who have possibly been raised in a "scene" that thrives on bragging and gossiping. It doesn't mean these people are bad, but it does mean they need to inform themselves and learn about personal and group security. Even seasoned activists can make mistakes when there is a general lack of security consciousness in our groups. And that's where those of you who are reading this can help. We must ALWAYS act to inform persons whose behaviour breaches security. If someone you know is bragging about doing an action or spreading security-compromising gossip, it is your responsibility to explain to her or him why that sort of talk violates security and is inappropriate.

You should strive to share this knowledge in a manner that encourages the person's understanding and changes her/his behaviour. It should be done without damaging the person's pride. Show your sincere interest in helping him/her to become a more effective activist. Keep your humility and avoid presenting a superior, "holier than-thou" attitude. Such an attitude can raise an individual's defences and prevent them from listening to and using the advice offered. The goal of addressing these issues with others is to reduce insecure behaviour, rather than showing how much more security-conscious you are.

Share your concerns and knowledge in private, so that the person does not feel as if they are being publicly humiliated. Addressing the person as soon as possible after the security violation increases effectiveness.

If each of us remains responsible for discussing security information with people who slip up, we can dramatically improve security in our groups and activities. When people recognise that lying, gossiping, bragging, and inappropriate debriefing damages both themselves and others, these

behaviours will soon end. By developing a culture where breaches of security are pointed out and discouraged, all sincere activists will quickly understand.

DEALING WITH CHRONIC SECURITY PROBLEMS

So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security precautions even after being informed several times? Unfortunately for them, the best thing to do is to cut them loose. Discuss the issue openly and ask them to leave your meetings, basecamps and organizations. With law enforcement budgets on the increase and with courts handing down long sentences for political "crimes", the stakes are too high to allow chronic security offenders to work among us.

By creating a security culture, we have an effective defence against informers and agents who try to infiltrate groups. Imagine an informer who, every time they ask another activist about their activities, receives information about security. It would frustrate the informer's work. When other activists discovered that she/he continued to violate security precautions after being repeatedly informed, there would be grounds for isolating the person from our groups. And that would be one less informer for us to deal with!

ADOPT A SECURITY CULTURE NOW!

Activists are restless and resistance is again on the rise. Some people are adopting radical and confrontational tactics. The more we organise and are effective, the more police forces continue to escalate their activities against us. For direct action movements to continue, we need to consider our security more seriously. Good security should be made one of our strengths.

A BRIEF PRIMER ON CANADA'S STATE SECURITY APPARATUS

Recent incidents of repression against activists illuminate the need for grassroots people to understand and practice movement security. Police monitoring, infiltration and agent provocateurs are routinely used by the state to collect information about our groups, or specific individuals in them, and to subvert our activities.

For example, during the APEC hearings, it was revealed that over seventy groups and individuals were monitored before and during the 1997 APEC Summit. In 1999, a paid industry informant/disrupter was identified at a BC wilderness action camp. Provocateurs also targeted some Vancouver activists, trying to convince them to disclose information and as well, to break the law.

The Canadian security apparatus identifies a number of our groups and activities as a threat to "national security". People and organizations are widely targeted; even avowed pacifists have been included in surveillance and repressive measures. According to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service's (CSIS) annual reports, activities targeted in the late 1990s included: native resistance, environmental & animal rights movements, anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti police-brutality, anti-racist, anarchist and communist groups. With the rise in militant First Nations' struggles; covert direct action against corporations; the renewed militancy and strength of popular struggles; and the mass-media's increasing focus on anarchists and anti-globalization protests, there is also a growing level of police surveillance and repression.

The need for security in our movements should be obvious - however, it is important that the awareness of security issues does not shut newcomers out and hinder the growth of our movements. One of the key aims of the FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program ("COINTELPRO") operations against the Black Panthers and American Indian Movement (AIM) was to spread distrust and paranoia so that these activists would be reluctant to integrate new people into their struggles. A security culture can exist in a large movement; indeed, it is one indication of a movement's strength. Arming ourselves with knowledge about how the system works and works against activists is essential in building security culture. The aim of this section is to give a brief run down of the working of domestic intelligence in Canada. In this way, we can better understand how to avoid its traps.

AN OVERVIEW OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is probably the best known of the "security" agencies that deal with activist "threats". Its predecessor was the Security Service division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (RCMP-SS). In 1984, following the *MacDonald Commission on the Illegal Activities of the RCMP*, the civilian spy agency CSIS took over RCMP spy work. That said, the RCMP did not abandon its intelligence gathering, it's just that CSIS specifically gathers political intelligence. The split from the RCMP allowed the new spy agency to do legally what the Mounties had been doing illegally. At the operations level, the new agency was granted more leeway in terms of public accountability than the Mounties had ever had.

CSIS carries out a wide range of surveillance activities. Since they are not a law-enforcement agency and since their evidence is not used in court, nothing stops them from contravening the few regulations that do exist regarding privacy rights. For example, CSIS is not required to inform people, as is RCMP, ninety days after a wiretap (or bugging) is over.

CSIS agents are allowed, with "authorization", to enter people's homes to plant bugs, wiretap phones, open mail and look into health, employment and government records without ever having to tell a targeted individual what they are doing. The information that they gather is used to build profiles and dossiers (files) on individuals, organizations, networks, etc. The information that they gather can and is passed on to other wings of the federal security system responsible for "law enforcement." These agencies will then obtain whatever warrants are necessary for legal surveillance (to be brought into court as evidence).

The National Security Investigation Service (NSIS), a section of the RCMP, is the primary law enforcement wing of domestic security. Many big Canadian cities have an NSIS office including Vancouver, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Milton and Toronto. In Ottawa, the NSIS maintains a computer database on activists, immigrants and so-called terrorists.

It is believed that the Vancouver NSIS employs between 12 and 18 members. Within NSIS there are several sub-groups called Team 1, Team 2, Team 3, - etc. that have different investigative targets. They employ informants, infiltrators, personal physical surveillance, electronic surveillance including phone and room "bugs" and other means of investigation and research.

The RCMP/NSIS also have other resources at their disposal during counter-insurgency operations. "Special O" is a team of surveillance specialists that may be called upon. "Special I" is a penetration team whose speciality is to break into homes, vehicles and other properties for investigative purposes. They are the team, which among other things, installs listening devices, photographs building interiors, etc.

In a long running case based in Vancouver, all of these methods of surveillance were used against several animal-liberation activists. During the Vancouver investigation, some targeted individuals located house and vehicle bugs. The bugs had large battery packs attached to facilitate less frequent battery changes. The NSIS also visited several activists across Canada in an attempt to question them regarding the individuals under investigation.

THE GOLDEN RULE OF SILENCE

It should be stressed throughout our movements that no one is under any legal obligation to provide to the police any more information than one's own name, address and birth date, and this only if one is under arrest. That is it! Saying anything more jeopardizes individuals' and movement security. Even answering seemingly insignificant questions can assist the police in developing personality profiles on a range of activists. It may not be "evidence" but it is used to give police "leads" on other suspects and construct intent during legal proceedings. The only principled response to police questioning when under arrest is to say nothing more than your name, birth date and address. If questioned further you can simply say "I have nothing to say (except in the presence of my lawyer and a judge)".

The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is an agency of the National Defence / War department, which has been long clouded in secrecy. They collect and process telephone, fax and computer communications of foreign states, corporations and individuals. The federal government uses the intelligence gleaned from the data to support troops abroad, catch "terrorists" and "further Canada's economic goals" (what that means is up to them).

Although the CSE is not supposed to collect the communications of Canadian citizens, it is a partner in the Echelon project - a multinational monitoring operation which sees CSE and counterpart agencies in the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand share intercepted communications of interest with one another - effectively creating a global surveillance web for "first world" English-speaking states.

Many activists are intimately familiar with their local police forces. Cops not only show up in blue uniforms, but also routinely practice undercover crowd infiltration activities either alone or jointly with other police forces depending on the type of case. At demonstrations they come along and take photographs and video for the record. They often appear in crowds as "fellow demonstrators". Undercover agents will also discretely identify individuals for later arrest. For example, at the 2001 Quebec City actions against the FTAA, one individual noticed and reported that someone chalk-marked an "X" on his backpack. It is not safe to confirm in a demo that you participated in any act deemed illegal; the wrong ears make good police witnesses. Undercover cops will also make arrests if they think uniformed police may provoke too much resistance, or if they think an element of surprise is called for.

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MODEL

Most Western states follow a model of counter-insurgency developed by Frank Kitson, a British intelligence expert, who after much field work in the British colonies wrote *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurrection and Peacekeeping*, (1971). He broke down movement development into three stages:

The Preparatory Phase: is when the movement is small, tends to focus on education, publishing and groundwork.

The Non-Violent Phase: is when the movement takes on more of a mass character. Large demonstrations are the norm.

In the Insurgency Phase: the movement has taken on a popular character. Perhaps a more assertive, guerrilla component has emerged.

Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency should occur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements are most vulnerable. They have not experienced a high degree of repression. They consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As they are not breaking laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely openly. The intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit these conditions and develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people. The information will be extremely valuable to them later on.

Important historical revolutionary activities and groups began as small, serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance and repression. It is therefore important to practice security at all points in the movement's development. State agents gather more than just "hard evidence;" they are interested in knowing about activists' beliefs as well. Police try to control with fear; don't be intimidated. Remember - If an agent comes knockin', do no talkin'.

INFILTRATORS, INFORMANTS AND PROVOCATEURS

Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return of mass mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as well as declarations to continue struggling in the streets and underground has drawn attention from the state's secret police. More infiltrators will be sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate individuals. The extent to which they are able to infiltrate our groups depends on our seriousness and responsibility in learning about, promoting, and working within a security culture.

Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo, contain, or remove the danger.

This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot and deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.

WHO IS AN INFORMER?

There are actually two kinds of informers. The deliberate informer is an undercover agent on the payroll of government or industry. The second type is the activist-turned-informer. Both kinds try to infiltrate our ranks and are equally dangerous to our movements.

Let's discuss the deliberate informers first. They are often difficult to identify. Informers can be of any age and any profile, but they do have a few discernible methods or operation, or "modus operandi". These are:

The "hang around" type: they are persons who regularly show at meetings and actions but generally don't get involved. They collect documents, listen to conversations and note who's who. This observation role is relatively inactive.

The "sleeper" type: is similar to the "hang around" modus operandi, except that their absorption of information is used to activate their role at a later date.

The "novice" type: presents a somewhat more active role, but confines themselves to less prominent work. They don't take initiatives, but the work they do is valued. This helps them build trust and credibility.

The "super activist" type: they come out of nowhere and all of a sudden, they are everywhere. Whether it's a meeting, protest, or an action, this person will be right in the thick of it. Keep in mind however that this can also be the mark of a new activist, whose enthusiasm and commitment is so strong that she/he wants to fight the power every minute of the day.

It should be said that with several of these modus operandi, the behaviour is hard to distinguish from a sincere new person's involvement. How do we tell them apart? Well, a planted infiltrator will ask a lot of questions about the direct action groups, individuals and illegal activities. She/he may suggest targets and volunteer to do reconnaissance as well as take part in the action. Infiltrators also try to build profiles on individuals, their beliefs, habits, friends, and weaknesses. At the same time, infiltrators will shield their true selves from other activists.

Anyone who asks a lot of questions about direct actions isn't necessarily an infiltrator, but they ARE someone you should be careful with. At the very least, they need to be informed about security issues. New activists should understand that direct action tactics can be risky (though some risks are worth taking!) and that asking a lot of questions endangers people. If the person persists in asking questions, there is a problem and appropriate measures must be taken. Activists who can't understand the need for security should be shunned and kept away from the movement.

Some types of infiltrators stay in the background and offer material support, other informants may have nothing to do with the group or action, but initially heard certain plans and tipped off the police. Among the more active types of infiltrators can be a gregarious person that quickly wins group trust. Some infiltrators will attempt to gain key forms of control, such as of communications/ secretarial, or finances. Other informants can use charm and sex to get intimate with activists, to better spy or potentially destabilize group dynamics.

Active infiltrators can also be provocateurs specializing in disruptive tactics such as sowing disorder and demoralizing meetings or demos, heightening conflicts whether they are interpersonal or about action or theory, or pushing things further with bravado and violent proposals. Infiltrators often need to build credibility; they may do this by claiming to have participated in past actions.

Also, infiltrators will try to exploit activist sensibilities regarding oppression and diversity. Intelligence organizations will send in someone who will pose as a person experiencing the common oppression of the particular activist group. For example, in the 1960's, the Weather Underground ("Weathermen" - a white anti-imperialist armed struggle in the US) was infiltrated by an "ordinary Joe" informant with a working class image. Black war veterans infiltrated the Black Panther Party.

A fresh example of police infiltration and manipulation tactics is that of Germinal, a group targeted for arrest two days prior to the April 2001 anti-FTAA demonstrations in Quebec City. Five months prior, the police set up a false transport company and specifically posted opportunities for employment in the vicinity of a Germinal member seeking employment. The trap worked. Tipped off by an initial informant, two undercover cops worked for four months in the group. This operation resulted in the media-hyped "dismantlement" of the group on the eve of the summit. Seven Germinal members were arrested, 5 of whom spent 41 days in preventive custody, only to be released under draconian bail conditions.

The police's covert action was in part about dismantling the group, but it was also about creating a media/propaganda campaign to justify the police-state security for the summit.

What are some ways of looking into the possibility that someone is an informer? Firstly, unless you have concrete reasons or evidence that someone is an infiltrator, spreading rumours will damage the movement. Rumours that you do hear of should be questioned and traced back. A person's background can be looked into, especially activism they claimed to have participated in, in other places. Do your contacts in those places know of the person, their involvement? Did problems ever come up? One important advantage of having links with far away places is that it makes it more difficult for informers to fabricate claims about their activities.

What are a person's means of living? Who are her or his friends? What sorts of contradictions exist between their professed ideals and how they live? One of our strengths as activists is our ideas and values, our counterculture, our attitudes towards the dominant society. Our sincerity in discussing these things is also a way of learning about each other.

When planning for new actions, care must be taken concerning who is approached. As little as possible should be said about the actual action plan until a person's political philosophy, ideas about strategy, and levels of risk they are willing to engage in have been discussed on an abstract basis. If there is a strong basis for believing this person might be interested in the action, then the general idea of an action can be run by them. Only when they have agreed to participate, do they come to the group to discuss action details.

During the trials of activists, police often reveal the kinds of information that they have gathered concerning our groups and activities. Note what revelations come out of these trials. What are the possible and likely sources of the information? Speak to persons that have been arrested and interrogated to see what they may have said to the police, or discussed in their jail cell.

Placing infiltrators in social justice and revolutionary movements is an established practice. It was done to the Black Panthers, AIM, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), and the peace/anti-war/and anti-nuclear movements on a large scale. Small groups, such as affinity groups, or working groups of larger more open organizations, need to be especially careful with new members. Direct action organizing is ideally done with longstanding, trusted members of the activist community.

This doesn't mean that no one else should ever be allowed into these groups. On the contrary, if our movement is to continue to grow, new people should be welcome and recruited; we just need to keep security in mind and exercise caution at all times.

But possibly an even greater threat to our movements is the activist-turned-informer, either unwittingly or through coercion.

The unwitting informer is the activist who can't keep his/her mouth shut. If someone brags to you about what they've done, make sure this person never has any knowledge that can incriminate you, because sooner or later, the wrong person will hear of it. These activists don't mean to do harm, but their bragging can be very damaging. It is your responsibility to instruct these people on the importance of security culture.

The other type of activist-informer is the person who cracks under pressure and starts talking to save his or her own skin. Many activists get drawn into situations they are not able to handle, and some are so caught up in the "excitement" that they either don't realize what the consequences can be, or they just don't think they'll ever have to face them.

Keep in mind that the categories of "planted informer" and "activist-turned-informer" can, and have been blurred. In 1970, during the height of the FLQ's activities, Carole de Vault - a young Parti Quebecois (PQ) activist was drawn to the FLQ, but then became a paid police agent. Her "activism" was with the PQ; she disagreed with the heavier FLQ actions since it threatened the "legitimate" work of the PQ. Her involvement with the FLQ was as a planted police informer.

KNOW YOUR OWN LIMITS

We have to know the possible consequences of every action we take and be prepared to deal with them. There is no shame in not being able to do an action because of responsibilities or circumstances that make it impossible for you to do jail time at this point in your life. As long as capitalism and all of its evils exist, there will be resistance. In other words, there will be plenty of great actions for you to participate in when your life circumstances are more favourable.

If others are dependent on you for support, you aren't willing to lose your job, or drop out of school or ruin your future career, DON'T DO THE ACTION. If you are addicted to an illicit drug and/or have a lengthy criminal record, the cops will use this to pressure you for information. If you don't feel capable of detoxing under interrogation and brutality, or doing a hell of a lot more time than your comrades, DON'T DO THE ACTION.

Make certain that you talk with others in your affinity group about situations that make you uncertain whether you should be involved in particular actions, especially those that are at a high risk of being criminalized.

Remember - there is no excuse for turning in comrades to the police - and those activists that do effectively excommunicate themselves from our movements. We must offer no legal or jail support to those activists who turn in others for their impact on our movement is far-reaching and can have devastating effects.

COVERT ACTION OTHER THAN INFILTRATION

Covert (or "Special") Action from police and secret service is also done outside of the group, with or without infiltration. These efforts include: intimidation and harassment, blackmail and manipulation, propaganda, informing employers and security checks, as well as physical sabotage like theft and arson.

Intimidation and harassment can include visits from secret service agents, calling you or your partner by their first name on the street, thefts where obvious clues are left. Police will try to blackmail people if they want to recruit or neutralize them.

Police uses propaganda in an attempt to poison the atmosphere and manipulate media and public opinion. In December 1971, when the FLQ was near its end and heavily infiltrated, the RCMP issued a false FLQ communiqué in the name of the "Minerve" cell. The communiqué adopted a hard-line position, denouncing the abandonment of terrorist action by a well-known activist, Pierre Vallières, and urging the continuation of armed struggle.

A recent example of police manipulation through the media involved the arrest of a young Montreal man in April 2000. He was accused of threatening to blow up a police station. The article was well placed in the newspaper, and opened by identifying the accused as an activist with COBP, the Collective Opposed to Police Brutality. This information, which was completely false, originated from the police. Meanwhile, the accused man was being held in jail and could not be reached. COBP, with the help of a lawyer, pressured the newspaper to write a retraction. But the police insisted that the accused claimed he was with COBP and so the media, instead, focussed on this "controversy". The accused, when finally reached, denied having claimed such a thing. And according to his lawyer, the prosecutor didn't raise the issue.

In Genoa, Italy, police played an active covert role in trying to discredit black bloc anarchists during the July 2001 meeting of the G8. Several reports reveal that Italian police masked as black bloc members attacked demonstrators and small shops. With a lack of public information, the police help manipulate public discourse along the lines of "how do legitimate demonstrators isolate activist thugs?"

Slandorous propaganda can take the form of anonymous letters, or rumours aimed at the activist milieu. There are also examples where police will make uncorroborated, casual accusations to journalists that, to use two examples, a person is a drug dealer, or that at a demonstration, a person aimed a handgun at an officer. It is often for slanderous reasons that police charge activists with "weapons possession" for having a penknife, or charges of violence like "assault."

The growth of the anti-globalization movement has been accompanied by renewed anarchist-scare propaganda on the part of authorities. Politicians and police attempt to massage public opinion, preparing people for a crack down, in order to legitimate the use of heavier methods of social control, exclusion and repression.

Manipulative disinformation spread through the media needs to be denounced as lies. There are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us demand retractions and corrections. Speak to the journalists involved, call them on their sloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and complain to the journalists' ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist, private-media for any kind of fairness.

It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of the police. There exists a long and documented history. Factual information about police covert activities also comes out as evidence presented in court. An important, too often neglected part of our strength is our knowledge of, and our protection from, police action against us.

YOUR RIGHTS

1. **YOU DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO THE POLICE OR INVESTIGATORS.** You do not have to talk to them on the street, if you've been arrested, or even if you're in jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow "inmates" in holding as they may be plants.

2. YOU DON'T HAVE TO LET CSIS OR THE POLICE INTO YOUR HOME OR OFFICE UNLESS THEY HAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST WARRANT. Demand to see the warrant. It must specifically describe the place to be searched and things to be seized. It must be authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.
3. IF THE POLICE DO PRESENT A WARRANT, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING OTHER THAN YOU NAME, ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE. Carefully observe the officers; you're in your own home you're not required to stay in one room. You should take written notes of what they do, their names, badge numbers, and what agency they're from. Have friends who are present act as witnesses. It's risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.
4. IF THE POLICE TRY TO QUESTION YOU OR TRY TO ENTER YOUR HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT, JUST SAY NO. The police are very skilled at getting information from people, so attempting to outwit them is very risky. You can never tell how a seemingly harmless bit of information can hurt you or someone else.
5. ANYTHING YOU SAY TO THE POLICE MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE. Once you've been arrested, you can't talk your way out of it. Don't try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond to accusations.
6. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO REVEAL YOUR HIV STATUS TO THE POLICE OR JAIL PERSONNEL. If you've been arrested you should refuse to take a blood test until you've been brought before a judge and have a lawyer of your choice.
7. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO TELEPHONE A LAWYER OF YOUR CHOICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. This means after you've been arrested, charged and booked into jail. This does not mean however, that you'll be given the right to speak with your family and friends. This is left up to the discretion of the police involved in your case.
8. LYING TO THE POLICE IS A CRIME.
9. IF YOU ARE NERVOUS ABOUT SIMPLY REFUSING TO TALK, YOU MAY FIND IT EASIER TO TELL THEM TO CONTACT YOUR LAWYER. Once a lawyer is involved, people will know more about your state i.e. charges, bail, court date, etc.

This handbook is a revised and updated, second edition, of "An Activist Security Handbook" (May 2000). It has been revised by Montreal's Collective Opposed to Police Brutality both to reflect our collective values, and to add pertinent local information and examples for the Quebec area. It is available in both French (LA SÉCURITÉ : L'ART DE SURVIVRE) and English.

We would like to acknowledge Monkeywrench Press for all their hard work in creating the first edition, and you can reach them at securitysite@tao.ca for more information or to make further contributions to this document. COBP's website address is: <http://www.tao.ca/~cobp/index.html>

May 2000 - Monkeywrench Press, First Edition
August 2001 – Collective Opposed to Police Brutality, Second Edition

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