

UNSCOM/IAEA SENSITIVE

NOTE FOR THE FILE

In the evening of 22 August 1995, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission met with General Hussein Kamal in Amman. The meeting was attended by Prof. M. Zifferero (IAEA), N. Smidovich (UNSCOM), and a person from King of Jordan court who served as an interpreter. The meeting started at 1950 hrs and lasted approximately three hours. The General spoke in Arabic with the follow-up translation by the interpreter.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Amb. Ekeus suggested that the meeting started with the nuclear issue. He asked for explanations on how far Iraq had progressed in its nuclear programme and what had been achieved.

Prof. Zifferero expressed the appreciation of the IAEA to the General for receiving them for an informal meeting to discuss activities carried out. It was of great importance for the IAEA to listen to the Minister's explanations on the full abandonment of the nuclear weapon programme by Iraq. Original Iraqi documents indicated that the programme had been terminated in January 1991 due to damage by coalition raids.

General Hussein Kamal - Iraq initially had one reactor and started four different projects. One project was headed by Dr. Jaffar and you are aware of it. There was a second project undergoing test and there were two projects under development. Some parts you have seen. A few months ago they had a project "Sodash". This was a new one. Some equipment was buried there but it was recovered recently. Part of this buried equipment was at the Sodash site. Other parts were "made to disappear".

Prof. Zifferero - what was the purpose of Sodash?

General Hussein Kamal - that was a new project. They were doing some digging activities for it and found this equipment. I was not aware that this equipment existed. The project was close to the "Iraqi factory" which is also a new project to produce machines.

Prof. Zifferero - so there was the Sodash project, they started digging and discovered equipment. What was this equipment for?

General Hussein Kamal - it was from Jaffar's project located on the river. This site was destroyed. (He accepted Zifferero's prompt that the site was called Tarmya.)

Prof. Zifferero - This was the EMIS project. What about the centrifuge project headed by Dr. Al Ubeidi?

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General Hussein Kamal - there were centrifuges. It was a department of the Ministry of Agriculture. It was situated at Al Salih.

Prof. Zifferero - Are you referring to Rashdiyah?

General Hussein Kamal - Yes, it is in the middle between Al Salih and Rashdiyah. You know the place. They manufacture their own centrifuges in two ways. One way was from maraging steel and the second - using carbon fibres. All centrifuges worked but they preferred the ones made of carbon fibre. With carbon fibre centrifuges, the speed of 60,000 rounds per minute was achieved and they were about to go to 100,000. This would be done in a different area but the activity was stopped by the war.

Prof. Zifferero - Why did Iraq admit the centrifuge project but refused to disclose the Rashdiyah site where centrifuges had been developed? Why did they insist on concealing Rashdiyah and claim that this project was at Tuwaitha? Why were they hiding?

General Hussein Kamal - You are saying Tuwaitha? There was nobody at this place from the nuclear department, including Jaffar, that was related to the centrifuge project. All worked on their own. Before the Rashdiyah site belonged to the Agriculture Ministry.

Prof. Zifferero - It was an irrigation project.

General Hussein Kamal - In the past, but then they started to use it.

Prof. Zifferero - We did not understand why they kept Rashdiyah from all disclosures of the centrifuge project. Why was this concealment strategy?

General Hussein Kamal - It was the strategy to hide, not to reveal the sites.

Prof. Zifferero - But they described all the details of the project. However, they continue to insist it was Tuwaitha not Rashdiyah.

General Hussein Kamal - They said that to divert attention.

Prof. Zifferero - they might be afraid we would destroy Rashdiyah, but it was not designed for the centrifuge project. This is the only reason I can imagine.

General Hussein Kamal - there was absolutely nothing that remained there that had belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture. It was the main centre.

Prof. Zifferero - There was a production line in the Furat project.

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General Hussein Kamal - Rashdiyah was the only place, not Furat. Manufacturing might be somewhere else.

Prof. Zifferero - The German company "Interatom" was building Furat to manufacture centrifuges. The company admitted that.

General Hussein Kamal - this was to produce large quantities, but work on design was at Rashdiyah. Those centrifuges used only a minimal amount of electrical power - 20 kilowatt.

Prof. Zifferero - you mean 20 megawatts.

General Hussein Kamal - No, I am saying 20 kilowatts. They also used another process. It is related to "little holes". They made those holes in two ways. One is an aluminium pipe - this is the generally accepted world method.

Prof. Zifferero - nickel is also used.

General Hussein Kamal - before that they used "powder" technology. They succeeded in both - in aluminium and powder, but decided that aluminium was preferable. They did it both - by chemical and mechanical ways. Mechanical way was to drill holes something like 27 million in one sq. cm. This process succeeded but also the centrifuge method. Dr. Ubeidi was in charge. The chemical way was in Tuwaitha but they have not advanced. It was destroyed during and after the war.

Prof. Zifferero - were there any continuation of, or present nuclear activities, for example, EMIS, centrifuge?

General Hussein Kamal - no, but blueprints are still there on microfiches. Electrical and mechanic methods were cheaper than centrifuge. Difficulties were caused by compressors. But we got some compressors from the US. They also worked on switches.

Prof. Zifferero - You are referring to spark gaps.

General Hussein Kamal - it was headed by Khalid Sa'id.

Prof. Zifferero - this is the person in charge of group 4 at Al Atheer.

General Hussein Kamal - you mean the site close to Al Hakam.

Prof. Zifferero - those four processes related to production of material for a nuclear device. So far we only talked about enriching uranium but they need other studies, eg. on implosion. This was done at Al Atheer. Is it continuing somewhere else?

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General Hussein Kamal - yes, but not now, before the Gulf War. First they studied 12 ton, then 9 ton and then 5 ton. These are weights of a device which they would make suitable for delivery. These were only studies. The smaller was the better so that the aircraft could deliver them. The smaller was also considered to be more effective.

Prof. Zifferero - any delivery by missile?

General Hussein Kamal - yes, but the restriction was on volume. It could have been on missiles. The main aim was to deliver by aircraft or missile.

Prof. Zifferero - one of the documents referred to "final experiment" with a device. We are aware that they were planning to dig a shaft vertically and then horizontally to create a chamber to test a device.

General Hussein Kamal - have you seen this at Al Atheer?

Prof. Zifferero - they surveyed many areas in the desert particularly in the South-West desert, in areas less populated.

General Hussein Kamal - there was a place for testing of spark gaps at Al Atheer.

Prof. Zifferero - but they also need to test the device. I want to understand whether the Iraqi document's reference to "final experiment" was the reference to a test or to combat use.

General Hussein Kamal - these were only studies. They had highly enriched uranium from France but it was under the IAEA safeguards. They also tried to make their own. All the time they worked to make it smaller but had never reached a point close to testing.

Prof. Zifferero - if it were only studies, conceptual work, it is hard to understand why millions of dollars were invested in facilities to produce enriched uranium in a range of tens of kilograms.

General Hussein Kamal - the reason for the studies was to use less uranium. They had only a few centrifuges so they could not produce a lot. French uranium was already suitable for bombs. But Russian uranium was only 80% enriched but still they can do it quicker than "normal" uranium.

Prof. Zifferero - yes. The Iraqi government indicated to us that after August 1990 orders were given to Dr. Ubeidi and Jaffar to start a crash project. This was to use enriched uranium from the French reactor and to enrich Russian material for bombs.

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General Hussein Kamal - no, not true. Had they had centrifuge, the decision was already there to use French uranium, but they were not ready with centrifuges.

Prof. Zifferero - this is my last question. Rolf Ekeus told me that it was an agreement to continue relations in the future. I hope we can continue meetings in the future. Minister's memory is a legend in Iraq. You are well known for your memory. (At this moment, Prof. Zifferero showed the General a document.) This document was claim to be sent to you, Minister, by one of the members of the special committee.

General Hussein Kamal - it is a false document.

Prof. Zifferero - we are of the same conclusion.

General Hussein Kamal - it is full of mistakes. The author has no knowledge. The first phrase in the letter is wrong. The data (in the right upper corner) is wrong. It is not correct.

Prof. Zifferero - it is a fake document..

General Hussein Kamal - it is not the work of the Iraqi intelligence, but some other. Possibly Egyptian. How did you receive this document and who signed it?

Prof. Zifferero - it was received by fax and we have only the first page. It was received in April 95.

General Hussein Kamal - they would have never written to me any such details.

Prof. Zifferero - Dr. Khidir Abdul Abbas Hamza is related to this document.

General Hussein Kamal - we call this person Hazem. He is dark, tall, bigger than me. He is a professional liar. He worked with us but he was useless and was always looking for promotions. He consulted with me but could not deliver anything. Yes, his original name is Khidir but we called him Hazem. He went to the Baghdad University and then left Iraq. He is very bad. He was even interrogated by a team before he left and was allowed to go. He used to work in the building opposite the Rasheed Hotel. It was a design center.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPON ISSUES

Amb. Ekeus started to explain to the General a diagram on Iraq's biological weapons programme (attached).

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General Hussein Kamal - Saadi was directly involved. He is a chemical engineer.

Smidovich - explained the Taha's group element on the diagram.

General Hussein Kamal - before Hakam there was Muthanna. They moved there from Salman Pak. Hakam was to produce bulk agents. From Salman Pak they moved to Muthanna or to a Ministry of Agriculture facility in Dora. After Salman Pak, they all went to Muthanna and all worked at Al Hakam to manufacture bulk agents. They have chosen that site away from population. Most work was done at Dora on anthrax. Below Saadi there was General Amer Rashid. Mutharda has become a minister. At the beginning there was a doctor whose name I could not remember. He came from the University and was the boss of Taha.

Smidovich - could it be Hindawi?

General Hussein Kamal - yes, Hindawi. He was there until all reserach on anthrax was completed.

Amb. Ekeus - we know that they weaponised agents in airbombs in December 1990.

General Hussein Kamal - yes, it was done at Muthanna. All agents were put in bombs with fibre-glass.

Amb. Ekeus - you are referring to DB-0 and DB-2 bombs?

General Hussein Kamal - I only remember fibre-glass munitions at Muthanna.

Amb. Ekeus - were there any missile warheads?

General Hussein Kamal - yes, but very few.

Amb. Ekeus - 25?

General Hussein Kamal - yes.

Amb. Ekeus - there was production of biological weapons at Fudaliyah.

General Hussein Kamal - yes.

Amb. Ekeus - some of the agents were put in bombs.

General Hussein Kamal - they used epoxy resin not fibre-glass.

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Amb. Ekeus - some were plant pathogens against wheat.

General Hussein Kamal - yes, they succeeded in it before the war. They started it since the Iranian War. It was to produce carbonization of wheat.

Amb. Ekeus - were they put into munitions?

General Hussein Kamal - I do not remember, but most likely they did. They were not used. You know there is a sweet water lake in Iran. They also had a similar agent to poison water but they had not succeeded.

Amb. Ekeus - mycotoxins?

General Hussein Kamal - I don't remember medical terms.

Amb. Ekeus - we know that the FMD Institute in Dora was involved.

General Hussein Kamal - yes, in two things. First - anthrax manufacturing. There was an island in England and they tested anthrax there.

Amb. Ekeus - was there any research done on the Ebola virus and haemorrhagic fevers?

General Hussein Kamal - yes, but I did not recall medical names. However, the main focus was on anthrax and a lot of studies were done.

Smidovich - were weapons and agents destroyed?

General Hussein Kamal - nothing remained.

Smidovich - was it before or after inspections started?

General Hussein Kamal - after visits of inspection teams. You have important role in Iraq with this. You should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective in Iraq. There was an engine for long range missiles. I didn't want to get involved. It was a lost battle and they chose to stop from using this.

Smidovich - we could not find any traces of destruction.

General Hussein Kamal - yes, it was done before you came in. The place where they buried them was found by you.

Smidovich - Is this the place north of Baghdad where they were buried?

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General Hussein Kamal - It was in a month you came in. Destruction of warheads started but I could not remember the details.

MISSILE ISSUES

General Hussein Kamal - I made the decision to disclose everything so that Iraq could return to normal.

Smidovich started to explain Iraq's acquisition from the Soviet Union of 819 missiles and 11 launchers.

General Hussein Kamal - not a single missile left but they had blueprints and molds for production. All missiles were destroyed.

Smidovich - what about launchers?

General Hussein Kamal - I don't have precise information but I know that two Russian launchers were hidden by the Special Forces. One was in dismantled status; and the second was complete. There was also a missile and a launcher from Yemen. During the Gulf War the missile was hit. The Russian missile was extremely accurate and they want to produce them in Iraq because we have only Luna and SCUD missiles. They want to produce such missiles in Iraq and they studied gyroscopes for pinpoint accuracy. Now they are working with Ukraine to modify gyroscopes.

Smidovich referred back to two SCUD launchers.

General Hussein Kamal - these two launchers are with the Special Guards. They are hidden in the same location where computer disks with information on nuclear programmes are. If you find one you will find the other. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific location. President Saddam's son, Qussay, knew where they are. Also General Kamal Mustafa knows. He was with the Special Guards and now he is with the Republican Guard.

Smidovich asked why they had decided to keep launchers while all missiles had been destroyed.

General Hussein Kamal - it is the first step to return to production. All blueprints for missiles are in a safe place - those for Al Hussein or longer range.

Smidovich - you mean for their own production?

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General Hussein Kamal - yes, for Al Hussein. They produced engines for Al Hussein. Some parts were purchased up to a thousand. They were all destroyed. Most important was gyros. There are two missiles - one worked by General Raad and another by Dr. Modher. They had two designs and worked for one year. One is of aluminium and another is of steel. The engines have differences and gyros are different. Warheads are also different. The aluminium missiles are lighter and have bigger warheads. Raad is working on them. Steel missiles have smaller warheads.

Smidovich - are you referring to Ababil 100 missiles with a range of 150km?

General Hussein Kamal - there was Ababil 100. They also produced missiles with a 50km range. Dr. Modher also worked on a motor design for a missile with a range of 3,000 km. He had blueprints.

Smidovich - was this two-stage or a single stage missile?

General Hussein Kamal - a single stage with a very big engine. It was a vertical launch. They also did some studies on cruise missiles after the war. You know, some US cruise missiles landed intact, so they studied them.

Smidovich asked about Chinese involvement in 3,000km missile.

General Hussein Kamal - It was only design. There was a Czech professor who helped Modher with this. He worked before the war. An engine for a 150km missile is even more difficult than an engine for 3,000km range missiles. Smaller engines are more complicated. It's a lot easier to work with big ones. They had only blueprints, nothing was implemented. After engines they needed to work on gyros, fuel and launchers. But fuel was not a problem. It was easy to make both liquid and solid. They succeeded in manufacturing solid propellants in a new way. They succeeded in giving more power to solid propellant.

Smidovich returned to the issue of two SCUD launchers.

General Hussein Kamal - the only thing I know is that they have them. The two launchers are at the same location as computer disks. Both Mudif Ubeidi and Modher have a lot of information on microfiches. People who work in MIC were asked to take documents to their houses. I think you will have a new war of searches.

Amb. Ekeus - the launcher issue is very sensitive.

General Hussein Kamal - I have a person with me who had a farm where molds for missiles were hidden. I will call for him.

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Smidovich - there were some rumours that you had been present at missile tests in 1989 or a chemical/biological weapons test in late 1990.

General Hussein Kamal - I have not been present at any tests. They need 2 or 3 days to conduct tests. There were no flight tests of biological or chemical warheads. Possibly there could have been a test of chemical but I don't remember.

Major Ezzeddin arrived at 9.40 pm.

Major Ezzeddin - I remember there were two molds hidden in my farm but they were taken away in 1992. As to the two launchers, I don't know.

General Hussein Kamal - two launchers are with the Special Guards. They are moved. One is totally disassembled but the other is complete. I don't understand why you consider launchers to be a big problem. In MIC, they could build launchers anytime.

Smidovich asked if other components were remaining in Iraq.

General Hussein Kamal - In Al Hussein they had Soviet- made gyroscopes not Iraqi ones. They were building a factory to produce gyroscopes in Iraq. They also ordered gyroscopes in the United Kingdom. Are you aware of this?

Smidovich said that the Special Commission was aware that the gyroscope parts were ordered by Iraq through Mr. Aws Hassan and his company, Cimarron. These parts were to be manufactured by different British companies but primarily at Norcroft.

General Hussein Kamal mumbled something in Arabic. In 1993 they tried to obtain gyroscopes from Russia. General Naim wanted to order them from Russia after the war but went to Ukraine.

Smidovich said that UNSCOM had a protocol between Iraq and Ukraine.

General Hussein Kamal - this was not for complete gyro system. It was to get know-how for missiles with a 150km range.

Smidovich asked him about a project related to a supersonic retarding parachute.

General Hussein Kamal - this was a preliminary work for modification of SCUD. But in general, we do not need to minimize the speed as separation succeeded. The faster the warhead is moving, the more difficult it is to intercept. This was the whole purpose. At the beginning, we have done some modification tests but it was stopped. The more speed, the better. This is the difference between Al Hussien and SCUD. Although Al Hussein has less explosive in a warhead,

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it has more destructive power than SCUD because its speed is higher and it is more difficult to intercept.

Amb. Ekeus - could parachute system be related to a delivery of unconventional warhead so that one gets effective dispersal of agents? Otherwise, missiles will explode inside the ground.

General Hussein Kamal - if you are referring to chemical and biological warheads, they exploded before impact. We tested this method. We used proximity fuses. These fuses are also used in artillery shells and we used them. These are fuses from devices to install mines. We fired missiles with such fuses against Iran and they did explode before impact.

Smidovich said that usually fuses from artillery shells would not work in missiles.

General Hussein Kamal - no, they are exactly the same as artillery. They measure distance from ground and explode. It is not easy to do. They were originally tested even with missiles that exploded in the air. Ababil 50 missiles are used to disperse landmines and they use the same fuses. There were two groups working on proximity fuses - one under General Saadi and the other - General Rashid. Each of them had his own team that worked in parallel.

Smidovich - you are saying that warhead separation succeeded?

General Hussein Kamal - yes. At the very beginning they used parachute. But when they succeeded in separation, they stopped parachutes. Parachutes were only used for a short period in 1986, ten years ago.

Smidovich - so separation succeeded?

General Hussein Kamal - that's how we bombed Israel. Warheads separated in Israel. They must be separated for accuracy and speed. During the war, I was in the southern area and I received reports that Israel claimed that they shot down some of our missiles. I asked why. I was asking because I was more involved in manufacturing. I was told that Patriot missiles were actually hitting the body of missiles not the warheads.

Smidovich - there was a report that only one missile was destroyed by Patriot.

General Hussein Kamal - one or two were hit by Patriots but it was by chance, not accuracy. They fired many missiles against each incoming missile. We did a lot of studies of missile interception and what is the best solution - separation. We even had concrete missile warheads.

Smidovich - you mean Al Hijara missiles?

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General Hussein Kamal - yes.

Smidovich - 5 missiles were fired?

General Hussein Kamal - The Americans and Europeans are spending a lot of money to produce interceptor missiles but the Russians are more advanced in this. In my view, it is a waste of money especially against multiple warheads.

Amb. Ekeus - The Patriot company should have become very rich.

General Hussein Kamal - I was with the General Staff and moved to the Presidential Security; the Special Guards. Then I was put in charge of the Republican Guard with only 30 people. The Republican Guard became very effective and contributed to the end of the war with Iran. I remember the battle called "Crown of Battles". We surprised the Iranians. The Iranians came in by boats along the Tigris River and blocked a road from Al Amara to Basrah. They moved into Hawr al Hammar. So they cut 1.5 million dunas of the Iraqi land. At that moment, the Republican Guard went into action. It was heavily armed. I was in Saudi Arabia to meet Crown Prince Abdullah. The Saudis were very worried. Their plan suggested a counterattack but I explained to Abdullah that the Iraqis can ouster the Iranians in 24 hours. The Iranians were well equipped with artillery, tanks and infantry but the Republican Guard pushed them out in 48 hrs. After that I came to the military industries. One of my first tasks was to produce rubber boats. I asked for authority to produce them. Before that, the Army was looking everywhere for them. But we bought fibre-glass and epoxy resin and soon we were producing 80 boats a day. This was our measure to counterattack in case of future attacks. We also built big boats for the Navy. They were 18 to 22 metres long and equipped with MLRS and machine guns. We operated them from the Gulf. So the Iranians taught us about boats. We also installed 81mm launch tubes, bought from Italy, on these boats. They were specially purchased as there were no such mortars in the Iraqi Army. You know, the plantations are very high in the Gulf and the Iranians used this as cover. So we need to take countermeasures. Iraq built boats with mini hovers and clean the plantations. We also used to lob ammunitions. Before me, the military industries were under Taha Jazravi. They were producing 5-6 shells per day and 120 mortar shells per day. I came in and numbers changed. We spent a lot of time on this. This is how my involvement with the military industries started. It was by the necessity of war. Before that, if someone would offer 2,000 artillery rounds, they would immediately send aircraft to pick them up. There was a desperate need.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUE

Smidovich asked about Iraq's VX programme.

General Hussein Kamal - they put it in bombs during last days of the Iran-Iraq war. They were not used and the programme was terminated. During the Gulf War, there was no intention

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to use chemical weapons as the Allied force was overwhelming. They finished work on binary that had a long-shelf life. In the old days, chemical weapon facilities were underground but this was a mistake and we put them above ground. Chemical weapon storages were also underground but it was a mistake.

At the beginning, they worked with one Egyptian scientist to make mustard gas. Then they proceeded to sarin, then VX, then binary. Sarin had a short life, mustard gas has longer effect but is not as potent as sarin. We knew that Austria did some testing on VX. The man responsible for the programme was General Faise. Imad Al'Ani also worked on VX. Now he is with the civilian sector. General Nazar was the Director of Muthanna. There was another person who worked at Muthanna but now he is director of a glass factory but I could not remember his name. VX was a purely Iraqi problem.

Amb. Ekeus - did they succeed in stabilizing VX?

General Hussein Kamal - they were able to do it by splitting VX into binary. Bombs consisted of two parts and they made it during the last days of the Iran-Iraq war. So the components were only mixed when fired. After the Iran-Iraq war, the factory was turned into civilian production. Iran also had mustard and sarin and they used mustard in small quantities. Some of the chemical components came from the US to Iraq. Even Iran bought some components from the US but when they arrived, the Iranians discovered they were water. There was a German middleman involved in the Iraqi CW programme. Now he is an Iraqi citizen. He is of Jordanian origin. UNSCOM met him. He now lives in Iraq. I think he was sent to Iraq to do work by foreign power.

Amb. Ekeus - did you restart VX production after the Iran-Iraq war?

General Hussein Kamal - we changed the factory into pesticide production. Part of the establishment started to produce medicine.

Smidovich asked if the General was referring to the Samarra Drug Establishment.

General Hussein Kamal - Samarra started to produce medicine with workers from Muthanna. Muthanna itself started production of pesticides and insecticides, but some of them turned out to be more difficult to produce than CW. We gave instructions not to produce chemical weapons. I don't remember resumption of chemical weapon production before the Gulf War. Maybe it was only minimal production and filling. But there was no decision to use chemical weapons for fear of retaliation. They realised that if chemical weapons were used, retaliation would be nuclear. They must have a revision of decision to start production. All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed.

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Smidovich asked if there was a report to the President with an inventory of all available proscribed weapons in mid-May 1991.

General Hussein Kamal - I am not aware but someone else could have done such reporting. I resigned from the Party in July as I did not want to be associated with their policies. It was Tariq Aziz's mistake.

Smidovich asked why missiles and chemical weapons were kept in part while biological weapons were all destroyed.

General Hussein Kamal - in the nuclear area, there were no weapons. Missile and chemical weapons were real weapons. Our main worry was Iran and they were against them. So enough for today.

CONCLUSION

Amb. Ekeus - there might be an opportunity to meet again, especially after we would study documents from the farm.

General Hussein Kamal - there are three jokes: first, that I was the one responsible for not disclosing past programmes; second, that I am a CIA agent and third, that the documents were hidden at my farm. There is a contradiction in what Tariq Aziz is saying. One day he is saying that he is in charge in Iraq, the next day he claims that I was concealing. There was a decision by the Revolutionary Command Council on the 31 August deadline and the ultimatum. Now they are saying they are working closely with you. Why such a sudden change? Once they follow their policy, results are dreadful.

Amb. Ekeus - when you left the country, they started to change policy.

General Hussein Kamal - the current government will never change. Otherwise I would not leave. They will remain as always. Last time they massed the Army in Basrah ready to go into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. I thought to leave at that time. They might think they might accuse me of being a traitor but I saw all kinds of battles. Until now it was planned to go into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. If I stop issuing statements to the public for three weeks, they will return to the old policies. Listen again to Saddam's speeches immediately after the Gulf War and now. Still no changes for Iraq: poorer and suffering. They are only interested in themselves and not worried about economics or political state of the country. First I thought to resign but then I decided not to work against regime from inside the country. Now after I left, I can state publicly I will work against the regime. There is a lot of bad writing against me but all Iraqis know that I am a doer, an "implementor". I was not involved in any of their wrongdoings. I led a quiet life. I never tried tea or coffee, smoke a cigarette or drank alcohol. The regime lost the entire Arab area and the Arab world lost Iraq. In 1948, there was a war between Israel on one side and

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Palestine and Arab countries on the other. Even now, the regime continue to end all statements with a slogan "Long Life Palestine" but the Palestinians signed peace with Israel. In Iraq, huge amount of water is wasted into the sea. Why could not Iraq give water to its neighbours. If there had been trust in the Iraqi regime, the neighbouring countries would have signed agreement, but with this regime, it might decide to stop water supplies. In Europe, there were wars lasting for 300 years. Now everyone is enjoying benefits from the policy of cooperation. Problems do exist but they are not solved by force. In 1968, Iraq went to the Soviet Union. The rest of the Gulf States had relations with US. This started the Cold War in the region. If all of us were dealing with one power, there will be no problems inside and outside. But the current regime went to USSR and that rose fears in US, Europe that the Soviet Union might take control. Who lost? Iraq, because they had no longer look into the interest of Iraq and the region. It is most important to be stable and not to go to war with its neighbours. It is this kind of policy that is putting Iraq back into the Stone Age. Nothing forbids good relations between Iraq and USA. Iraq needs it - for stability, for Iraq. If Russia and US are in the area, there will be problems. The Government of Iraq is instigating fundamentalism in the country. This is of concern for Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. It is against Europe and US. Now Baath Party members have to pass a religious exam. This would strengthen Iran. It would be detrimental for the whole region. (The interpreter remarked that Iraq and Iran would have the same mentality.) This will be another world war. Every party member has to pass a religious exam. They even stopped party meetings for prayers.

Notes were taken by N. Smidovich.